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The conditions for democracy in a future South Africa
A. W. Stadler
It is not inconceivable that the formal institutions of democracy, with
universal adult suffrage in a unitary state at the centre, will be
introduced in South Africa in the foreseeable future. It is also not
beyond the bounds of probability that these formal institutions will be
overtaken by a coup d'etat, or a one-party dictatorship which will
subordinate or suppress opposition and dissent.
This paper is concerned to investigate the most propitious conditions for
a stable future democracy in South Africa. Like other similar
undertakings, the paper is primarily based on comparative studies rather
than on South African political, economic or social material. The main
conditions which will be investigated are social, or socio-economic;
political; and institutional. The political conditions will be discussed
in two intimately related contexts: the one focused on policy, and the
other on political power. But it will also become clear that it disputes
the assumption made in the earlier literature that it is possible neatly
to separate political conditions from social ones, or to assume that the
chains of causality can be arranged in a linear fashion.
The paper hopefully contributes to political debates going on in this
country. It therefore has a political purpose. It also makes the
assumption that academic debate may contribute meaningfully to desirable
political ends. However, the paper does not, except in a superficial and
piecemeal way, consider the extent to which South African conditions
provide evidence of emergent properties conducive to democratic
stability, or otherwise.
Each of the conditions is the subject of great controversy in the
literature, and much of the paper will be concerned to argue positions
within the controversies. It ought not to be forgotten either that the
very notion of democracy is itself a matter of controversy and polemic,
and that the position which writers adopt in response to the substantive
problem hinges on their understanding of, and attitude towards,
democracy.
The socio-economic conditions of democracy: wealth or equality?
The orthodox position on this issue in political sociology was long
dominated by S.M. Lipset, who made two important claims which have
commanded strong support in non-Marxist political sociology. The first
was that democracy was related to the state of economic development.
The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chances that it will
sustain democracy ... only in a wealthy society in which relatively
few citizens lived at the level of real poverty could there be a
situation in which the mass of the population intelligently
participate in politics and develop the self-restraint necessary
to avoid succumbing to the appeals of irresponsible demagogues.1
The second claim he made was a corollary of the first: much of the book
elaborates the idea that the working classes were particularly vulnerable
to authoritarian and extremist political movements.
In sum, there are two biases in the argument. One privileges economic
growth; the other extols limited or constrained participation,
particularly working class participation, in politics.
S. M. Lipset, Political Man, London, 1959, 49-50.
The interest in these arguments for a student of democratisation in South
Africa is that both are current in contemporary reformist debates. The
thesis that economic growth provides the basis for democracy was developed
in the well-known O'Dowd thesis which predicted the democratisation of
South Africa in the wake of industrial growth, although O'Dowd modelled
his thesis on W. W. Rostow's The Stages of Growth, not Lipset's work. It
was thus more directly than Lipset's work based on a linear, determinist,
stage-based conception of historical process.
One of the implications of this argument, which was not foreseen, or not
discussed, in the original formulations, was that conditions of economic
stagnation or decline, such as set in from the early 1970s, might be
unpropitious for the installation of democratic institutions.
Embedded in the Lipset thesis about the economic bases of democracy were
a number of assumptions about the meaning of democracy. It rested
explicitly on the "equilibrium" model of democracy developed by Joseph
Schumpeter, defined as competition for power between elites, which
usurped and obliterated the older meanings held equally by its opponents
and its advocates.2 These older meanings had embedded the concept of
democracy in the struggles of the poor and the marginalised for political
expression and power. They are virtually excluded in the Schumpeterian
conception of democracy. So too are those conceptions of democracy as a
process of political learning achieved through participation. These
issues will be considered in the discussion on political institutions.
Like the thesis prescribing growth as the condition for democracy, the
argument in favour of a notion of democracy as requiring limited
participation in government (and a limited state too) has resurfaced in
the reformist debate in South Africa, in various forms, including
monetarism, federalism, and in notions of "divided sovereignty", etc.
Mr Justice Steyn, the former chairman of the Urban Foundation crystallised
these ideas in an elegant combination of the Lipset thesis and the theory
of overloaded government which became current during the 1970s:
Some social scientists have observed that democracy is often most
stable when most of the basic problems of the society have been
solved and the population at large has been able to reduce its
political fervour. In developing situations, including our own,
our most basic problems of material inequality and deprivation,
under the most favourable circumstances, will take many decades to
alleviate to the extent that they no longer generate political
passion. In societies with large masses of undifferentiated need,
the popular demands on government are immediate and powerful -- and
very easily exploitable by democratic opposition to the point that
no government can enjoy the security to pursue its longer-term
priorities. Prompted by the many acute needs of the masses, a
competitive democratic opposition can make facile promises, and
thus create expectations that no government can meet.3
Within a few years of the appearance of Lipset's book, the publication
of Barrington Moore's work cast doubt over the major assumption that there
was a direct and uniform relationship between socio-economic conditions
and political democracy, or indeed any specific form of government.
Moore's case studies in "historical sociology" provided the basis for the
2
 Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, London, 1942, chapters 21 and
22.
Speech at Durban, 8 June 1988.
argument that there were three, and not one, routes to modernity, and that
only one of them led to democracy.ft
Yet in casting doubt on the validity of the Lipset thesis in one respect,
Moore confirmed it in another. The major condition for democracy, he
argued, was the prominence, or even predominance, of the bourgeoisie in
the array of social forces seeking political change during the period
preceding democratisation. Without this condition, the probable result
would be a failure to modernise, or modernisation under the auspices of
an aristocracy leading to fascism, or alternatively a communist
revolution.
This position has in turn been challenged and modified. John Stephens has
shown that because Moore's study stopped too early, it underplayed the
role of the working classes in the achievement of democracy and overstated
the role of the bourgeoisie.
Stephens, like Therborn, whose influence he acknowledges, argues that the
working class needs allies from other classes in order to achieve the
final push towards democracy. But in contradiction of Moore, he shows that
these allies are found among the peasantry and the urban middle class,
and not the bourgeoisie. Except in England and France, the bourgeoisie
was a centre of resistance to the political incorporation of the working
class. The democracy which the bourgoisie supported was democracy for the
propertied.
Stephens adds an issue which confirms one argument in Moore's study, but
in a way which contributes a refinement which is absent from Moore's book:
Stephens accepts that the bourgeoisie contributes towards the
establishment of parliamentary government, but insists that it is the
working class which democratises that form of government.5
A second way in which a refinement of the Moore thesis contributes to the
understanding of the conditions of democracy lay in his argument that the
major precondition was the need for a violent break with the past. But
it is important to add that this was not elaborated in any systematic way,
nor was it linked specifically to the conditions for democracy. Rather
it provided one of the conditions for modernisation. Therefore Moore's
work, though important in disposing of the consensualist bias which
characterised the Lipset thesis, did not clarify the political conditions
fully, nor relate these to the social and economic ones.
Another implication of Moore's study, and the criticism of it by Stephens,
is that it raised the issue of the political conditions for modernisation,
and specifically for economic growth, as well as the political conditions
propitious for democracy. Although fuller discussion of this issue must
be postponed, there is at least one problem which needs airing now: the
conditions most propitious for the formal establishment of democratic
institutions were not necessarily the same conditions for the maintenance
of stable democracies'.
Barrington Moore, Jnr, The Social Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the making of the modern world. London,
1966.
John D.Stephens, Democratic Transition and Breakdown in Western
Europe, 1870-1939: a test of the Moore thesis, American Journal of
Sociology , 94 (5), March, 1989, 1019-1077.
Goran Therborn made an incisive contribution towards the development of
this position in a paper which tilted the balance of plausibility even
further away from the Lipset thesis.
Therborn argued that far from democracy being established during periods
of economic growth and social consensus, the most propitious periods for
the establishment of democracy were periods of political and
socio-economic upheaval and dislocation. The "striking absence in the
history of bourgeois democracy is that of a steady, peaceful process
accompanying the development of wealth, literacy and urbanisation." He
stressed the importance of defeat in war, and the attendant social
upheaval, as major conditions for the installation of democratic
institutions. Of eighteen cases which he cites, six (or seven) democracies
had their origins in military defeat, and in another eight cases, war was
"causally decisive" in installing democracies. Democracy, he argued, was
a "martial accomplishment". But Therborn did not pursue the issue of the
stability or otherwise of democracies once they had been established.6
This issue was raised by Edward Muller in an important comparative study
which confronts the Lipset thesis directly on its own terrain, that of
the general socio-economic conditions conducive to democracy.
Muller argued that the most important socio-economic condition for stable
democracy was not growth but equality, and conversely, the conditions
least favourable was inequality. The main lines of his argument may be
summed up as follows. Democratic government produces egalitarian effects,
but these effects are gradual rather than rapid:
the egalitarian influence of democracy is a gradual process,
resulting from a country's accumulated years of democratic
experience, rather than a relatively immediate effect of the level
o£ democracy in a given year.
He argued that on the average approximately 20 years of democratic
influence were required for these egalitarian effects to occur; "a second
generation of democratic experience enhances this egalitarian effect."
In the present context, one of the most important of Muller's findings
was that countries with "less than a generation of democracy are no less
inegalitarian, on the average, than nondemocracies..." It is these
countries which display the features which he describes as "unsta.ble
democracies": those in which the formal institutions of democracy are
vulnerable to being replaced by authoritarian regimes. Mullerrs study
confirmed precisely the broad thesis which Robert Dahl asserted in his
Polyarchy , published in 1971:
In a society that already has a regime with public contestation,
extreme inequalities increase the chances that competitive politics
will be displaced by a hegemony. Polyarchies are particularly
vulnerable to the effects of extreme inequalities. Extreme
inequalities in the distribution of key values are unfavourable to
competitive politics and to polyarchy because this state of
affairs... is equivalent to extreme inequality in the distribution
of key political resources and is likely to generate resentments
and frustrations which weaken allegiance to the regime.
Muller's statistical analysis confirmed this exactly: "All democracies
with high income inequality ... were unstable. These very inegalitarian
democracies were highly susceptible to military coups, which were
Goran Therborn, The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy, New
Left Review, 103, 21.
responsible for four of the six instances of instability." Muller's
broader conclusion about political strategies is also worth quoting at
length:
If a democratic regime is inaugurated in a country with an extremely
inegalitarian distribution of income, high inequality is likely to
undermine the legitimacy of the regime and cause democratic
institutions to be replaced by authoritarian rule. . . I t seems the
only way to break out of this vicious circle is for a strong
political party with redistributive goals to develop during the
early years of democracy and then hold office for a sufficiently
long period of time to implement policies that significantly reduce
income inequality.7
The political conditions: a strong left-wing party and strong
unions
An earlier paper by Christopher Hewitt was more explicit about the
kind of political party, and the sort of strategies it would require
to reduce inequality as rapidly as possible. He argued that
political democracy was not a sufficient condition for the
achievement of a more equal society. "The crucial matter is what
the mass electorate does with the franchise and other democratic
procedures. Only if the lower classes use their votes to elect
socialist governments will democracy result in more equality, since
non-socialist governments will not be concerned with redistribution
and social equality."8
The conclusion that equality and not wealth was the crucial
socio-economic condition for stable democracy ought not to obscure
the fact that growth in a relatively poor country like South Africa
will in fact remain an important priority in the future. The fact
that the case for economic growth is often argued with an
anti-democratic purpose in mind, or without consideration of the
social or political costs or consequences, ought not to minimise
its importance for a democratic society.
Peter Lange and Geoffrey Garrett showed that the impact of "domestic
political-economic structures" were just as important in affecting
the economic performance of national economies as their positions
in the international economy. In particular, they suggested that
the organisational structure and political power of labour were key
determinants of economic performance under the stagflationary
conditions prevailing during the 1970s.
Centralised and dense unions and powerful political parties
of the Left appear conducive to the development of the
politics of concertation between unions, employers'
associations and government . . . Concertation, in turn, is
associated with a 'virtuous circle' of government political
economic policy, which both promotes and is promoted by
regulation of workers' behaviour in the market... Where this
7
 Edward N. Muller, Democracy, Economic Development and Income
Inequality, American Sociological Review, 53 (1), February, 1988,
esp. pp. 59-66.
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 Christopher Hewitt, The Effect of Political Democracy and Social
Democracy on Equality and in Industrial Societies: A Cross-Natonal
Comparison, American Sociological Review, 1977, 42, 450-464,
virtuous circle is established, it results in better
aggregate economic performance.9
Their study emphasised that the presence of both a powerful
Left-wing party and a strong union movement were indispensable in
securing economic growth. "Labour strength only in the market or
in politics may not be conducive to economic growth." They add an
interesting rider: where "labour is weak, both organisationally and
politically, it is possible that this general weakness will be
associated with economic performance levels similar to those where
the labour movement is very strong." This rider may tempt support
for a union-bashing policy from those for whom this has anyway
ideological and political attractions. In fact, there would seem
to be economic advantages to capital, particularly large-scale
capital which may offset these ideological and political
disadvantages.
Lange and Garrett argue that associations like unions can advance
the interests of their members through one of two strategies:
redistributional or collective gains. They would be more likely to
support the second strategy -- for instance by supporting growth
through imposing wage restraints on their members, if they could
be certain that their members would benefit from such a strategy.
Because capital, not labour determine how profits are distributed,
there is in fact considerable uncertainty that this will happen.
"There is nothing ... to stop capitalists from spending profits in
ways which only inefficiently contribute to national economic
growth, such as distributing large portions to stock-holders or
deciding that overseas investments are more attrative than domestic
ones."
These uncertainties might be reduced by labour taking control over
the investment process -- that is to say, by the transformation of
the political economy into a socialist state. But an alternative
-- a more feasible alternative -- way of reducing uncertainties
would be to use state policy to reduce the risks involved in a
"collective gains" strategy. They argue that two political
conditions are likely to "induce capitalists to spend profits in
ways efficient for domestic growth, while also assuring that
workers will share proportionately in the fruits of that growth and
will be protected as well as possible should the expected growth
not materialise...: an historically strong political Left, and
prospects for direct control of government by a party of the Left,
closely linked to the union movement." The authors argued that an
"encompassing" union movement would be inclined to pursue a
collective gains strategy (such as growth) rather than a
redistributionist one; while the presence of strong Left
governments would reduce the risks that this strategy would not be
translated into economic gains for workers.
The remainder of their paper consisted of an empirical verification
of this hypothesis. It will not be repeated here. It is worth
quoting one final remark from the study.
Our findings also make clear that the economists' prejudice
-- that politics just gets in the way of optimal economic
performance -- can only be sustained under certain
circumstances. The conditional relationships we have
Lange, P and Garrett, G, The Politics of Growth: Strategic Interaction
and Economic Performance in the Advanced Industrial Democracies,
1974-1980, Journal of Politics, 47, 1985, 792-827.
uncovered certainly suggests that where unions are very weak
or are stronger but fragmented, governments of the Left or
the Right will find it difficult and probably fruitless to
attempt to use political means to achieve desired market
outcomes through labour self-reglation. The desired outcomes
are more likely to be more effectively and efficiently
achieved by letting the market do its work. In fact, where
the unions are fragmented but strong enough to disrupt market
outcomes, governments which are perceived to support labour
may actually contribute to poorer growth performance.
In 1988, Alexander Hicks undertook a re-examination of the study.
He confirmed that a combination of powerful unions and powerful
left-wing governments are conducive to economic growth. Contrary
to the assumptions embedded in the "overloaded government" thesis,
he argued that strong unions and left-wing governments contribute
significantly to economic growth, to job security, and to income
redistribution. He thus tends to strengthen the case made by Hewitt.
One of the reasons for this is the capacity of strong unions to use
wage restraints to stimulate growth.10
The studies by Lange and Garrett were based on advanced industrial
countries. It could be argued that South Africa does not exhibit
comparable features in its demographic, social, political, economic
and infrastructural make-up. This may be true in many respects.
But it ought to be stressed that South Africa is a mature industrial
society, albeit one with special features. Despite these features,
it should be recalled that by I960, 30% of its workforce was
employed in industry -- the same as Japan. (Subsequently, the figure
for Japan has increased to 37%, while it has remained about constant
for South Africa.) In two respects, the relative maturity of the
South African industrial economy suggest that one of the structural
conditions for concertation is present, and the other at least
emergent.
The first condition of concertation is that feature of the South
African economy so widely criticised by left and right that it has
become something of a ritual to condemn it -- the heavy
concentration of control over the political economy located in a
handful of companies. It ought to be noted that this is a feature
too of the Swedish economy which was reinforced by Social Democratic
tax policy which benefits the richest and the poorest income groups
at the expense of the two intermediate ones.
After the protracted repression of black labour, it is possible to
see developing the second condition for concertation: an
increasingly coherent and well-organised union movement with a
highly competent leadership. But of course it would require the
establishment of universal political rights, including the right
to organise politically before the potentialities of this latency
could be realised.
True, the South African union movement is not -- or not yet -- a
movement in which any sigfnificant level of "concertation" has
taken place, and it is also one which remains highly vulnerable to
attack by the state. What is absent of course is a powerful
left-wing party in power or in a position of influence over
government. This is precluded at present by the battery of
anti-leftist legislation, by the state's systematic attacks on the
1D
 Alexander Hicks, Social Democratic Corporatism and Economic Growth,
The Journal of Politics, vol 50, 1988, 676 - 704.
left, and by the absence of common political rights which would
enable the majority of workers to achieve political organisation.
This situation forces the union movement to opt for strategies of
"redistribution" rather than of "collective gains", simply because
the risks that the benefits of wage restraints will not benefit
workers, or contribute signficantly to growth, are very high. From
the perspective of capital, interested in growth, the situation is
also unsatisfactory. It is difficult to imagine turning the clock
back to the days when growth could be achieved because the weakness
of the union movement made it difficult to prevent controls over
wages being imposed from outside.
In the circumstances, then, capital and labour canot collaborate
on a strategy of growth. Such a strategy could only be attained on
the basis of the accession to power of a left-wing government, which
capital shows little sign of welcoming. But it may find this
prospect less inimical with its interests than current propaganda
suggests.
The implications for policy: the need for social democratic
strategies.
Philip Pettit has made an incisive analysis of what a social
democratic theory ought to be. Before developing its main features,
attention ought to be given to the open-ended institutional and
programmatic features of such a theory: as Pettit writes, it is a
'philosophy for policy-making, not a closed list of political
programmes." He even contemplates the possibility that such a
project may ultimately be non-statist in character.
Pettit emphasises that social democracy shares the same values as
liberalism in that both emphasise the ideal of equal respect. They
differ in that liberals assume that conditions of formal equality
and common rights are sufficient to satisfy the condition of equal
respect-ability. Social democrats require the active promotion of
such an ideal by the state.
The fundamental purpose of a social democratic project is to bring
about a situation in which people achieve equal respect. This
requires, in his argument, policies designed to redress
inequalities in two areas: capacity and power. Strategies designed
to redress inequalities in capacity are termed "emancipatory", and
are intended to emancipate people from "penury, ignorance,
vulnerability; in particular vulnerability to sickness and
disability." Social security, public housing, compulsory education
and public health are some of the items on an emancipatory agenda.
Pettit insists that their provision should in "in kind, universal
and monopolistic."
The empowering requirements of a social democratic theory
necessitate strategies aimed at reducing or eliminating obstacles
to equality such as coercion, exploitation, manipulation,
discrimination and marginalisation. Among such strategies would be
social security against exploitation by employers, systems for
monitoring and eliminating discrimination, and forms of
participatory democracy in both workplace and community.11
Philip Pettit, Towards a Social Democratic Theory of the State
Political Studies, 1987, 35, 537-551.
It may be necessary to extend the list of strategies in order to
emphasise issues which give proiminence to some of the particular
features of the South African situation. For instance, the
extremely skewed distribution of access to land and land ownership
would seem to suggest that a vigorous programme of land reforms
would be required to redress inequalities in power. The second
problematic area in which cultural marginalisation is a feature of
the present society is the broad area of language and culture. A
significant proportion of the society is effectively marginalised
by their inability to speak English.
Democratic institutions.
One of the implications of the critiques we have sketched so far
is that it is difficult to separate out socio-economic from
political factors, or to arrange their interaction in any neat
linear form. Indeed, one important trend in the recent literature
is the way in which politics, in very broad terms (implying
conjunctures, policies, political forces, and political forms)
comprises an intrinsic element in economic policy-making and
development.
The problem with representative instititions.
Particularly important is the growing recognition that democratic
participation, far from posing a threat to economic growth and
development during the period of late capitalism may under
conditions such as specified by Hewitt, contribute to these
processes. But in order to understand how this could be achieved,
it is necessary to investigate in much greater detail specific
problems in the equilibrium model developed by Schumpeter, and to
raise alternative models.
The attack on this conception of democracy rested on two main
arguments. The first was that it suppressed and almost obliterated
the original meaning of democracy -- held equally by left and right
-- as the political instrument employed, in Macpherson's account,
by the weak, the rightless and the poor against their subordination
to the rich, powerful and privileged. The institutional measure,
already touched on in our discussion of social democratic
philosophy, will be briefly discussed presently in the context of
participatory democracy.
The second line of attack on this conception of democracy, and on
the political institutions which were held to express it, was that
they failed to allow the formation of new institutional
arrangements needed to generate structures, procedures and policies
required to confront the economic and social crises of the 1970s
and 1980s, of which economic stagnancy, unemployment, and failure
to exploit new technologies were the most important. This failure
was attributed to the central feature of the representative system
the substantive exclusion of the majority from effective
participation in politics and the control of government policy by
a coalition between party politicians and state bureaucrats, a
coalition which precluded the possibility of innovation in response
to the changes of the 1970s and 1980s.
For some theorists, like Paul Hirst, the limitation on public
participation lay at the heart of the incapacity of the British
government to initiate needed innovations in policy. It is
interesting that this exclusion was the very feature which writers
like Schumpeter, took to be its central merit. Schumpeter had seen
the merit of competitive, representative democracy to lie in the
limitations it imposed on participation -- in effect, participation
was limited to political professionals; what he called the "masses"
were excluded.
In an important paper, Andrew Martin placed the issue in historical
and comparative perspective by suggesting that liberal democracy
and the competitive party system which evolved within it created
the conditions under which industrialising elites could effectively
be protected against democratic pressures during the earlier phases
of industrial development.
This insulation was vital in securing the political conditions for
capital accumulation, particularly in countries where significant
elements in the subordinate classes had gained the franchise prior
to, or early in, the industrialising process.
The capacity to insulate these elites rested on a variety of
factors. In the United States, it was secured by the displacement
of class issues by regional, ethnic and racial issues from the 1890s
onwards by both the major parties, and the common commitment by
their leaders to industrialisation.
The insulation thus created was comparable to that which was
achieved in the Soviet Union under Stalin through the instrument
of the single, bureaucratically centralised, party. The effect of
insulation in each case undermined the formal democratic rights
enjoyed by American and Soviet citizens. In the long run it led
to a declining interest in, and participation in, electoral
politics by the working class.
But for Martin, the mechanisms which in an earlier period maintained
the conditions for accumulation remained intact long after they had
outlived their utility in supplying the conditions for economic
growth. They did so because they continued to service the interests
of private groups, and those of their political allies in party
governments and state apparatuses. These no longer enjoyed the
ability to introduce the new measures necessary to generate the
conditions for economic development in subsequent phases of
capitalist development. According to Martin, they were unwilling
and unable to remove investment decisions from private interests,
and their replacement by what Keynes had termed the "comprehensive
socialisation of investment" which he saw as the only means of
securing an approximation of full employment."12
Paul Hirst offers an outstanding critique of representative
democracy which corroborates at a theoretical level the historical
analysis made by Martin.13 The element in his essay which is
important in the present context is that the control over official
administration and policy initiation by an alliance of party
leaders leads to secrecy and control over policy information.
Secondly government is so big that it is difficult for either
cabinet or party intent on bringing about changes to coordinate
policy. Consequently, the British government is unable to undertake
the reforms necessary to reverse its economic decline. "Between
12
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1963 and 1979 a succession of governments promised to modernise
Britain." They failed, and so has Mrs Thatcher.
Heidi Gottfried's paper on the computer industry offers detailed
analysis of the weakness of state planning in Britain, leading to
a failure on the part of the British state to improve the economic
performance of the country in general or the computer industry in
particular. Although she locates her explanation at the level of
the international political economy rather than in the state's own
institutions, the attention she gives to this issue corroborates
Hirst's broader argument: No comprehensive planning apparatus; ad
hoc innovations; weak institutional connexions between state
planning and the Treasury and Bank of England; conflicts between
agencies; policy changes with each change of government.111
Corporatism
One of Hirst's proposals, widely echoed in the current literature,
was to develop corporatist structures, but not to abandon
representative ones. In essence, coporatism involves the effective
representation of, and participation in government, of what Victor
Magnagna terms 'strategic actors", of which big business and
organised labour are the most important and characteristic.
Corporatism is is the logical institutional framework for the
development of the process of concertation referred to earlier.
Victor Magagna argues that the essence of corporatism is a politics
of representative efficiency.
Its "genius" or virtue is to attempt to literally represent
the preconditions of economic stability in the core arenas
of the state. Corporatism is the search for an architecture
of institutions that will bind together strategic actors in
a permanent network of bargaining, subject to public
regulation. Corporatism also seeks to resolve economic
conflict through direct negotiation rather than through
marketplace coercion or political disruption...
He puts the point differently by arguing that corporatism is
enunciated in a rule which would state that "in any conflict of
interest groups one should support those interests whose joint
impact on economic performance is greatest, and whose joint
cooperation is most important for economic -outcomes. He
acknowledges the defect in corporatism: that it restricts the
meaning of popular sovereignty to an interest in economic growth.
But it could be argued that this defect can be remedied by
envisaging corporatist structures as having their reach bounded by
other institutional limits to those areas in which economic
stability can be pursued.15
Direct participation
Representative and corporatist forms of participation serve
important functions in a democracy: the former providing a public
arena for political debate about broad policy and strategy; the
lti
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latter for economic policy-formation involving the "strategic
actors" of the economy. But neither representative nor corporatist
forms of representation resolve the central problem of democracy
in a highly unequal society, in which a large proportion of citizens
are very poor, marginalised and subordinated to the rich and
powerful: How is a democratic hegemony to be constituted and
maintained. This question cannot be answered in institutional, let
alone constitutional terms, for much will depend on the particular
circumstances of the transformation towards the establishment of
the formal democratic institutions.
It is suggested that a third institutional form, that of direct
participation in political, cultural, economic and social affairs
by ordinary people via "non-strategic" bodies may provide ways to
secure at least the active participation of groups effectively
excluded from representative and corporatist structures.
Contemporary political theory is rightly sceptical of the political
effectiveness of this form of representation in the context of the
nation state. It might be claimed that direct participation is
ineffective in securing access to any but the most limited forms
of governmental institutions. Yet in some ways it is misleading and
short-sighted to envisage the purpose of direct democracy to
achieve direct inputs into governmental decision-making.
Anterior to that problem is the one of securing participation in
the formal and informal associations, like political parties and
trade unions, the participation of which in either or both
representative and corporatist institutions is legitimised
precisely on the basis of the voluntary support gained from their
members. In other words, the interest in participatory democracy
may lie in the capacity of direct particpation to counteract
oligarchic tendencies in political parties and trade unions which
have been observed since the serious study of political
organisation was first undertaken during the nineteenth century.16
The strong state.
The lynch-pin of a social democracy incorporating these forms of
representation is the strong state. Only a strong state, that is
to say, one capable of achieving autonomy from particular
interests, can work effectively to preserve personal autonomy from
those interests, as well as preserving the integrity of political
structures from corruption and patron-clientelism, and from
authoritarian and arbitrary systems of government.
Indeed, there is considerable support for the case that only strong
and autonomous states make possible the conditions for establishing
liberal democracy, let alone a social democracy. But it is the
social-democratic state in particular which is required to be
powerful if it is to effectively pursue the objectives of democratic
socialism.
1G
 The Nicaraguan constitution incorporates an interesting combination
of representative institutions, designed to encourage political
competition and debate, and partcipatory ones, intended to create the
basis for the political hegemony of the poor and the marginalised.
Cf Jules Lobel, The new Nicaraguan constitution: uniting
participatory and representative democracy, Monthly Review, 39 (7),
December, 1987.
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Robert Fatton has made a critical analysis of the state in Africa
which hinges around the problems of states whose ruling classes
achieve direct control over the state without gaining hegemony in
society.
In such societies, the state fails to secure the relative autonomy
which, he argues, is the indispensable condition which make "reform
possible, despotism unnecessary, and liberal democracy viable."
Only a strong, relatively autonomous state is capable of organising
and defending the long-term interests of the ruling class, even
against the short-term interests of that class. This autonomy makes
it possible for the state to "extract certain sacrifices from the
ruling class and make certain concessions to popular classes".
The failure to achieve hegemony forces the ruling class to rely on
the threat of direct violence, rather than their "moral, material
and intellectual leadership. Politics is not consensual but
Hobbesian, and the ruling class is dictatorial not democratic."
Moreover in the absence of an autonomous state, these states are
ridden with the politics of lineage and ethnicity, patron-client
relations and the inevitable corollary, corruption.17
The strong state, in these terms, is the very antithesis of the
arbitrary, repressive and corrupt state. It is the authoritative
state, corresponding to Gramsci's conception of the hegemonic
state.
The strong state cannot be constructed overnight. It is the
consequence of a reciprocal process of interventions by the state
which provide social and economic benefits which in turn generate
support and legitimacy from among ordinary people. The most
important interventions are those produced in the course of
developing strategies of emancipation and empowerment. The rule
which Pettit enunciated that the supply of emancipatory benefits
should be in kind, universal and monopolistic was intended to serve
the principal objective of equal dignity. But it can readily be seen
also as a means of preserving the integrity of the state against
the problem, all too real, that welfare systems in poor communities
may become captured in a vicious cycle of corruption and
patron-client networks. It is interesting that land reforms may
work to undermine clientelist political structures and large-scale
political violence, even in a country like El Salvador where it was
introduced in order to generate some legitimacy for a regime which
represented the landed oligarchy.18
There are, of course, dangers in the authoritative state. As Gordon
Graham reminds us, arbitrary and despotic forms of rule, such as
the tyrannies imposed by Idi Amin or Bokasa may be destructive, but
they are too inefficient to impose a wholesale regimentation on
society. It is the authoritative states, such as those of the
17
 Robert Fatton, Jnr, Bringing Back the Ruling Class in Africa,
Comparative Politics, April, 1988, 253-4.
18
 T. David Mason, Land reform and the breakdown of clientelist politics
in El Salvador, Comparative Political Studies, 18 (4), January, 1986,
487-516.
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Communist block, Khomeini's Iran, and Pol Pot's Cambodia which can
succeed in this. 19 But that danger must be faced when it is reached.
October, 1989.
Gordon Graham, Politics in its Place, Oxford, 1988, 190.
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